

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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February 25, 1975

DOS REVIEWED 21 MAR 2011 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER *al*
ROBERT B. OAKLEY *WB*

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Air Defense Team

On February 19th, we attended a preliminary debriefing of the U.S. military team sent to Arman earlier this month to explore Jordan's requirements for air defense.

Preliminary findings of the team were almost purely military in character, and contained no political considerations. In essence, the team determined that the air defense requirements of Jordan were divided into three priority areas of interest:

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- the four army divisions;
- air bases and air control radars;
- defense of the Arman-Zarqa complex.

Options were developed for each of the areas of interest. The highest option in cost was about \$500 million, and provided:

- a Chaprral/Vulcan (C/V) battalion for each division;
- a four-battery C/V battalion for protection of air bases and radar;
- sixteen additional F-5E's with advanced radars, and upgrading the radars of the 32 F-5's now in Jordan's inventory;
- a six battery battalion of HAWK with associated radar and fire control systems for the Arman-Zarqa complex.

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Unsubstantiated

The team had not examined REDEYE, since the system is out of production, and would cost \$20 thousand per missile if production were reopened. However, REDEYE may be the best short-term political instrument to reassure the Jordanians, and the team was asked to add considerations of it in the report.

The team will complete the report under the auspices of JCS. State will coordinate on the recommendations, adding a political element to a purely military evaluation. The report will be submitted to the NSC by March 5th.

Their conclusions are essentially those of the State/Defense survey team which went to Jordan in 1973. The proposals which the team has made - even the most expensive options - will not end the vulnerability of Jordan to an Israeli attack, in the opinion of the team. However, the air defenses proposed would make such an attack much costlier and Israel will be disturbed by U.S. approval of air defense sales to Jordan. The real question is how to balance Israeli interests against a combination of air defense systems which can be used to achieve our political goals and bolster morale in Jordan's military, thus insuring continued support for the King.

The team spoke only in terms of availability of equipment from the end of existing production lines; hence delivery times start at about two years in the future. This appeared to be acceptable to the Jordanians; however, based on past experience we could expect a request for accelerated deliveries once we might commit ourselves to any course of action.

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